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RIGHTS OF WASHINGTON JUNIOR LIENORS IN NONJUDI-
CLAL FORECLOSURE-Washington Mutual Savings Bank v.
United States, 115 Wash. 2d 52, 793 P.2d 969, clarified, reconsidera-
tion denied, 800 P.2d 1124 (Wash. 1990).
Abstract" In Washington Mutual Savings Bank v. United State.% the Washington
Supreme Court extended the anti-deficiency provisions of the Deed of Trust Act to all
non-foreclosing junior lienors. Because this decision makes all junior obligations uncol-
lectible following a nonjudicial foreclosure, it may have a chilling effect on lenders and a
serious impact on the availability of home equity loans. This Note examines the Washing-
ton Mutual decision and suggests that the court should have determined instead that a
deficiency is allowed, but should be computed after applying any surplus value in the
property sold against junior obligations. This Note also recommends a statutory solution
to restrict the anti-deficiency provisions to foreclosing lienors.
Suppose Mega Corporation decides to expand its business operations
into Yourtown, Washington. Mega purchases a $L000,000 office build-
ing by paying $100,000 cash and borrowing $900,000 from Interna-
tional Big Bank, which secures the loan with a deed of trust. Later,
Mega borrows $50,000 from Little Neighborhood Savings Bank to con-
struct a plush office suite in the building. Mega signs a promissory note
and gives Little Neighborhood Savings Bank a second priority deed of
trust on the building. When profits fall off, Mega defaults on both
loans. International Big Bank exercises its option to foreclose
nonjudicially. Big Bank's trustee quickly sells the building for
$900,000, which the trustee promptly pays to International Because of
this sale, Little Neighborhood Savings Bank's security, the building, is
gone. Under Washington law, can Little Neighborhood Savings Bank
recover the $50,000 loan Mega Corporation promised to repay? Appar-
ently it cannot, based on the Washington Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the Washington Deed of Trust Act in Washington Mutual
Savings Bank v. United States.'
The Washington Deed of Trust Act2 created a nonjudicial foreclo-
sure option for deeds of trust as an alternative to the cumbersome
traditional judicial mortgage foreclosure system.' Because foreclosing
lienors derive substantial benefit from the nonjudicial alternative, the
1. 115 Wash. 2d 52, 793 P.2d 969, clarified, reconsideration denied, 800 P.2d 1124 (Wash.
1990).
2. 1965 Wash. Laws ch. 74, §§ 1-13 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 61.24.010-.130 (1989 & Supp. 1990)).
3. A trust deed is a mortgage equivalent, in which the borrower deeds the property to a third
party (trustee) who holds the deed as security for the lender. Gose, The Trust Deed Act in
Washington, 41 WASH. L. REv. 94, 96 (1966).
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Act also included anti-deficiency provisions.4 These provisions limit
nonjudicially foreclosing lienors, such as the hypothetical Big Bank, to
recovery of the foreclosure sale price.5 The Washington Mutual Sav-
ings Bank v. United States6 decision wrongly extended the reach of
this statute to preclude non-foreclosing junior lienors' recovery. By
applying the anti-deficiency provisions so broadly, the Washington
Supreme Court has placed junior lienors, such as Little Neighborhood
Savings Bank, in an untenable position. Now, not only do junior lien-
ors have no control over the loss of their security, but they also lose
the underlying obligation. Because the underlying obligation is elimi-
nated, borrowers like Mega Corporation avoid their debts to junior
lienors.
The court subsequently issued a clarification of its Washington
Mutual holding.7 While continuing to hold that junior lienors have no
right to "sue for a deficiency" the court stated that it was not address-
ing the continued right of junior deed of trust holders to "sue the
debtor on the promissory note."8 However, this "clarification" only
made the law more uncertain because the term "sue the debtor on the
promissory note" is the same as "sue for a deficiency." The legislature
should amend the Deed of Trust Act to eliminate this ambiguity and
to restore non-foreclosing junior lienors' rights to obtain full payment
of their obligations following nonjudicial foreclosure.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Washington Deed of Trust Act
The use of deeds of trust as a security device for real property
financing is not new in Washington.' However, prior to enactment of
the Washington Deed of Trust Act10 in 1965, the only method avail-
able for lenders to collect on loans from defaulting borrowers was judi-
cial foreclosure of the trust deed as a mortgage.1" Judicial foreclosure,
which is still available, has certain disadvantages for lenders. Not only
4. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.100.
5. Id
6. 115 Wash. 2d 52, 793 P.2d 969, clarified, reconsideration denied, 800 P.2d 1124 (Wash.
1990).
7. 800 P.2d at 1124 (clarification was later incorporated in the amended 115 Wash. 2d 52, but
not identified as a clarification).
8. 115 Wash. 2d at 59, 800 P.2d at 1124.
9. Gose, supra note 3, at 94.
10. 1965 Wash. Laws ch. 74, §§ 1-13 (codified as amended at WASH. Rxv. CODE
§§ 61.24.010-.130 (1989 & Supp. 1990)).
11. Comment, Court Actions Contesting the Nonjudicial Foreclosure of Deeds of Trust in
Washington, 59 WASH. L. REv. 323 (1984) (authored by Joseph Hoffinann).
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do lenders face delays inherent in any judicial proceeding, but pur-
chasers of judicially foreclosed property do not initially acquire clear
title to the property. 2 Foreclosed borrowers and junior lienors have
the right to redeem the property up to one year from the date of sale. a
Consequently, lenders sought a more favorable alternative.14
The Washington Legislature enacted the Deed of Trust Act to pro-
vide an efficient and inexpensive alternative to judicial mortgage fore-
closure. 5 The Act reflects a compromise. It attempts to balance the
lenders' benefits with the borrowers' rights and to place the judicial
and nonjudicial methods on equal footing. The Deed of Trust Act
statutorily imposes on lenders a choice of remedies. 6 Lenders may
sue on the obligation, judicially foreclose as a mortgage, or
nonjudicially foreclose under the trust deed power of sale.17
In a traditional judicial foreclosure, the foreclosure itself destroys
the underlying obligation only to the extent the sale price satisfies the
obligation.' 8 Any part of the judgment that remains unsatisfied is a
"deficiency."' 9  Lenders then may obtain a deficiency judgment.
20
This judgment imposes personal liability on mortgagors for the unpaid
balance.2 '
12. Gose, supra note 3, at 94-95.
13. Redemption must occur within eight months of sale for non-agricultural property if the
judgment creditor has waived its right to deficiency judgment; otherwise, it must occur within
one year. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 6.23.010-.020 (1989). Further, if the foreclosed property is the
borrower's homestead, the borrower has the right to continued occupancy during the redemption
period. Id. § 6.23.110.
14. Gose, supra note 3, at 95.
15. IM. at 95-96; see also Cox v. Helenius, 103 Wash. 2d 383, 387, 693 P.2d 683, 685-86
(1985).
16. See infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text; see also Whitehead v. Derwinski, 904 F.2d
1362, 1363-64 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining the choice of remedies under the Deed of Trust Act).
17. Thompson v. Smith, 58 Wash. App. 361, 366, 793 P.2d 449, 451 (1990). However, the
lender must choose only one of these options. WAsH. REV. CODE § 61.12.120 (1989) ("The
plaintiff shall not proceed to foreclose his mortgage while he is prosecuting any other action for
the same debt or matter which is secured by the mortgage .... ). Washington does not permit
strict foreclosure. Id- § 61.12.060. A judicial decree of strict foreclosure vests title of the
property in the mortgagee without any sale of the property. BLACK'S LAW DicIoNARY 646
(6th ed. 1990).
18. See generally G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, REAL ESTATE FiNANCE LAW §§ 2.1-2.2 (2d
ed. 1985).
19. Id.
20. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.12.060 (1989). Similarly, under common law, a lender also
could obtain a deficiency judgment following strict foreclosure. G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES
§ 333 at 699 (2d ed. 1970).
21. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 422 (6th ed. 1990). The court may exercise discretion before
the sale to establish a minimum bid (upset price) or after the sale to set a fair market value. If the
court sets a fair market value, the excess of the fair market value of the property sold over the
sale price then must be credited against the foreclosing lienor's obligation before determining any
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If the lender elects the streamlined nonjudicial method, the Act pre-
cludes the lender's right to recover any deficiency.22 The nonjudicial
alternative authorizes the trustee of a deed of trust to conduct a public
sale of the property.23 Such a sale results in the purchaser acquiring
title free and clear of junior liens because the foreclosed debtor has no
right of redemption in nonjudicial foreclosure, and because junior liens
are extinguished.24 Under the anti-deficiency provisions, a foreclosing
lienor's recovery is limited to the proceeds from the sale of the security
and the lienor has no recourse against the borrower personally.
2
However, the Act does not provide expressly for destruction of the
underlying obligation.
B. Application of the Washington Anti-Deficiency Provisions
Prior to Washington Mutual Savings Bank v. United States,26 no
Washington court had addressed the applicability of the anti-defi-
ciency provisions to non-foreclosing junior lienors. The courts have,
however, explained foreclosure options under the Deed of Trust Act,
and the application of the anti-deficiency provisions to foreclosing
lienors.
The Washington Supreme Court first addressed foreclosure options
available to lenders in Fluke Capital & Management Services Co. v.
Richmond. 27 The court found that creditors may use judicial or non-
judicial procedures to enforce their security.28 If creditors elect the
deficiency. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.12.060 (1989); McClure v. Delgazzi, 53 Wash. App. 404,
406-07,767 P.2d 146, 147-48 (1989); see also National Bank of Washington v. Equity Investors,
81 Wash. 2d 886, 924-25, 506 P.2d 20, 43 (1973); Bank of Hemet v. United States, 643 F.2d 661,
669 (9th Cir. 1981) (applying California's analogous statute).
22. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.100 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
23. Id, § 61.24.040. Sale may occur as soon as 190 days after default. Id.
24. Id. § 61.24.050; Donovick v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 111 Wash. 2d 413, 420-21, 757
P.2d 1378, 1382 (1988) (Dore, J., dissenting) (borrower has no right to statutory redemption in
nonjudicial foreclosure). However, the IRS can redeem under federal statute. See infra note 41
and accompanying text. Because judicial foreclosure is a forced sale, the borrower also has a
right to preserve a certain portion of the value of residential property as a homestead. WASH.
CONsr. art. XIX, § 1. Prior to either judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure, all lienors (as well as the
defaulting owner) have a right of equitable redemption, which permits a lienor to acquire the
senior obligation by paying the amount in default. Such payment reinstates the debt and avoids
foreclosure. G. OSBORNE, supra note 20, §§ 304-05.
25. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.100 (1989 & Supp. 1990) ("Foreclosure, as in this chapter
provided, shall satisfy the obligation secured by the deed of trust foreclosed, regardless of the sale
price or fair value, and no deficiency decree or other judgment shall thereafter be obtained on
such obligation .... ).
26. 115 Wash. 2d 52, 793 P.2d 969, clarified, reconsideration denied, 800 P.2d 1124 (Wash.
1990).
27. 106 Wash. 2d 614, 724 P.2d 356 (1986).
28. Id. at 624, 724 P.2d at 363.
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nonjudicial method, that election limits their remedy to the proceeds
from the foreclosure sale.29
The court expanded on the Fluke decision in Donovick v. Seattle-
First National Bank,30 where the court explained that although the
waiver of the right to a deficiency judgment is part of the price lenders
pay for using the nonjudicial procedure, such a waiver does not
include relinquishing the right to realize on all the security given on
the loan."1 The debtor, Donovick, argued that the nonjudicial foreclo-
sure of one trust deed fully satisfied the underlying obligation, thus
precluding the creditor bank from foreclosing on a second deed of
trust another parcel of land that secured the same obligation because
such foreclosure would be equivalent to granting a deficiency judg-
ment.32 The court upheld Seattle-First's right to foreclose the second
trust deed, concluding that a contrary holding would result in "an
unjustified, unwarranted windfall to the debtor" by eliminating both
Seattle-First's security in the second parcel and its right to collect on
the underlying obligation.33
C. The Washington Mutual Case
The Washington Supreme Court applied the anti-deficiency provi-
sions to a non-foreclosing junior lienor in Washington Mutual. The
case arose when the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit certified to the Washington Supreme Court the question
whether Washington law allows a non-foreclosing junior lienor that
purchases property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale to recover a defi-
ciency.34 The underlying case was a quiet title action on real property
owned by Robert and Christine Shell.35 The property had a fair mar-
ket value of $64,000.36 Yakima Federal Savings & Loan Association
held a first trust deed on the property to secure a debt of $41,000. In
addition, Washington Mutual Savings Bank held a second trust deed
on a loan with a $29,800 balance. Finally, the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS) had filed a third-priority tax lien for $150,000.
3 7
29. ALd
30. 111 Wash. 2d 413, 757 P.2d 1378 (1988).
31. IL at 416, 757 P.2d at 1379-80; see also Gose, supra note 3, at 96 n.14.
32. 111 Wash. 2d at 415, 757 P.2d at 1379.
33. Id at 416, 757 P.2d at 1380.
34. Washington Mut. Say. Bank v. United States, 115 Wash. 2d 52, 54, 793 P.2d 969, 970,
clarified, reconsideration denied, 800 P.2d 1124 (Wash. 1990).
35. Id.




The Shells defaulted on both loans and Yakima nonjudicially fore-
closed.38 To protect its interests, Washington Mutual purchased the
property at the trustee's sale for the amount then owed on Yakima's
loan, $42,020, 39 considerably less than the fair market value. The IRS
stated its intention to redeem the property from Washington Mutual,
as authorized by the Internal Revenue Code.4 The Code allows the
IRS to redeem real property subject to federal tax liens from purchas-
ers at nonjudicial foreclosure sales.41 The IRS offered Washington
Mutual $42,020 for the property, based on the Code provision that
defines the redemption price in such cases.42 The Code states that the
redemption price is the actual price paid by the purchaser at the fore-
closure sale and includes that amount of the purchaser's secured obli-
gation that is satisfied by the sale. 3 At issue was how much of
Washington Mutual's obligation the foreclosure sale satisfied. Only to
the extent Washington Mutual could not obtain a deficiency judgment
against the Shells would the IRS pay any amount over the price paid
by Washington Mutual. The IRS argued that Washington law allows
a non-foreclosing junior lienor to obtain a deficiency judgment after a
nonjudicial foreclosure.'
Washington Mutual agreed, but contended that the IRS's offered
redemption price of $42,020 was computed incorrectly.45 Washington
Mutual argued that the IRS should pay either: (1) the purchase price
plus the balance due on Washington Mutual's deed of trust,46 or (2)
the fair market value of the property.47 The district court agreed that
the redemption price should be the fair market value.4 After the IRS
refused to pay this price, the court quieted title in Washington
Mutual.4 9 The IRS appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
which certified to the Washington Supreme Court the following ques-
38. IM.
39. Id. The purchase price represented the $41,000 initial debt, plus interest.
40. Id. at 55, 793 P.2d at 970.
41. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7425(d)(1) (West 1989). Of course statutory redemption was not
available under Washington law. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.050 (1989).
42. 115 Wash. 2d at 55-56, 793 P.2d at 970-71.
43. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2410(d) (West 1978); Treasury Regulations on Procedure and
Administration, 26 C.F.R. § 301.7425-4(b)(2)(ii) (1989) (provides for treating a junior lienor
who purchases at foreclosure sale as a foreclosing lienor).
44. Brief of Appellant at 10, Washington Mut. Sav. Bank v. United States, 115 Wash. 2d 52,
793 P.2d 969, clarified, reconsideration denied, 800 P.2d 1124 (Wash- 1990) (No. 56245-8).
45. Washington Mutua 115 Wash. 2d at 55, 57, 793 P.2d at 970. 971.
46. Purchase price of $42,020, plus the $29,800 balance due, or $71,820.
47. Fair market value was $64,000. Washington Mutual, 115 Wish. 2d at 54, 793 P.2d at
970.
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tion: "In Washington, may a nonforeclosing junior lienor who
purchases property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale sue for a defi-
ciency under Washington law, and, if so, what is the manner of com-
puting the deficiency?" 50
The Washington Supreme Court answered the certified question by
holding that "there is no authority in Washington law for allowing
any lienholder to sue for a deficiency following a nonjudicial foreclo-
sure sale."5" Washington Mutual moved for reconsideration, 2 con-
tending that although the court's conclusion was correct "as applied
to the narrow facts of this case," the anti-deficiency provisions should
be applied only to a non-foreclosing junior lienor who purchases at the
foreclosure sale. 3 The IRS did not object. 4 The court denied that
motion, but did issue a "clarification" of its holding.5 The clarifica-
tion said in full, "We do not herein address the matter of a junior deed
of trust holder's continued right to sue the debtor on the promissory
note because it is not before us."
5 6
D. The Law in Other States
Four states with deed of trust systems have anti-deficiency provi-
sions similar to Washington's, in that they prohibit lienors that choose
nonjudicial foreclosure from obtaining a deficiency judgment. Courts
in three of the four states, California, Alaska, and Montana, have
addressed the applicability of these statutes to non-foreclosing junior
lienors.5 7 In each case they have concluded that non-foreclosing jun-
ior lienors have a right to obtain a deficiency judgment following a
senior lienor's nonjudicial foreclosure.
The California Code of Civil Procedure contains anti-deficiency
provisions analogous to the Washington Deed of Trust Act." The
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Washington Mut. Say. Bank v. United States, 800 P.2d 1124 (Wash. 1990).
53. Motion for Reconsideration at 4, Washington Mut. Say. Bank v. United States, 800 P.2d
1124 (Wash. 1990) (No. 56245-8).
54. Appellant's Answer to Motion for Reconsideration at 2, Washington Mut. Say. Bank v.
United States, 800 P.2d 1124 (Wash. 1990) (No. 56245-8).
55. 115 Wash. 2d at 59, 800 P.2d at 1124.
56. Id.
57. See infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text. The fourth state, Oregon, has no case law
on point.
58. The California Code of Civil Procedure provides:
No judgment shall be rendered for any deficiency upon a note secured by a deed of trust or
mortgage upon real property... hereafter executed in any case in which the real property
... has been sold by the mortgagee or trustee under power of sale contained in the mortgage
or deed of trust.
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Code prohibits deficiency judgments when the property has been sold
by a mortgagee or trustee under a deed of trust power of sale. 9 The
California Code, however, also has "fair value" provisions that more
specifically define how to compute a deficiency. It is the difference
between the amount of the obligation and the greater of the foreclo-
sure sale price or the fair market value.' These "fair value" provi-
sions, passed before the anti-deficiency provisions, were enacted to
prevent lienors from purchasing property for a nominal sum at a fore-
closure sale and then realizing a double recovery by obtaining a large
deficiency judgment.6'
The California Supreme Court has reviewed the applicability of the
anti-deficiency provisions to non-foreclosing junior lienors. In
Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 62 the court held that junior lienors that
lose their security through a senior lienor's nonjudicial foreclosure sale
may obtain a deficiency judgment. 63 The Roseleaf court reasoned that
a junior lienor's right to recover a deficiency should not be controlled
by the whim of a senior lienor.6" Justice Traynor noted that unlike the
selling senior lienor, the junior lienor is not in control and "is in no
better position to protect himself than is the debtor.
'6
Although the California Supreme Court has not specifically
addressed the effect of the anti-deficiency provisions on purchasing,
non-foreclosing junior lienors, California courts of appeals have. In
Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. Bloxham, 66 the court held that even
junior lienors that purchase at senior lienors' nonjudicial foreclosure
sales are not barred from obtaining a deficiency judgment.67 There-
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(d) (West 1990).
The Washington Deed of Trust Act and mortgage statutes were modeled after Oregon stat-
utes, which in turn were copied from California. 2 WASH. STATE BAR ASS'N, WASHINGTON
REAL PROPERTY DESKBOOK § 41.1, at 41-5 (1979).
59. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580(d) (West 1990).
60. Id. §§ 580(a), 726; Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 15 Cal. 3d 590, 542 P.2d 981, 988-89, 125
Cal. Rptr. 557, 564-65 (1975); see also Coppola v. Superior Court (Singer), 211 Cal. App. 3d 848,
259 Cal. Rptr. 811, 826 (1989) (equity dictates applying § 580(a) to junior lienor who purchases
at senior's nonjudicial foreclosure sale).
61. Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino, 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 101, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873, 877
(1963).
62. 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963).
63. 378 P.2d at 101, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
64. Id at 102, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
65. Id at 100, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 876.
66. 176 Cal. App. 3d 266, 221 Cal. Rptr. 425 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
67. Id. at 273, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429. The deficiency judgment is limited to the lesser of the
excess of indebtedness over the fair market value or the excess over the sale price. CAL. Civ.
PROC. CODE § 580(a) (West 1990); 176 Cal. App. 3d at 270,221 Cal. Rptr. at 427; see also Bank
of Hemet v. United States, 643 F.2d 661, 667-70 (9th Cir. 1981); Citrus State Bank v.
242
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fore, California courts have applied anti-deficiency provisions after
which Washington's were modeled in a manner contrary to the appar-
ent holding in Washington Mutual.
Alaska's anti-deficiency provisions also contain language similar to
Washington's. 68  These provisions prohibit a deficiency judgment
when a trustee makes a sale under a deed of trust.69 The Alaska
Supreme Court, in Adams v. FedAlaska Federal Credit Union,70 stated
that the Alaska provisions are similar to California's and held that
junior lienors who purchase at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale may
obtain a deficiency judgment.71 Thus, the Alaska courts, like the Cali-
fornia courts, disagree with the Washington Supreme Court's position.
The Montana Code's terminology varies somewhat from the Wash-
ington, California or Alaska statutes.72 It refers to trust indentures
and foreclosure by advertisement and sale, which are the functional
equivalents of trust deeds and nonjudicial foreclosure. The Code pro-
hibits a deficiency judgment when a trust indenture is foreclosed by
advertisement and sale.73 In First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, N.A. v.
Wann, 74 the Montana Supreme Court found that the statutory prohi-
bition does not apply to a creditor holding a note that is no longer
secured because of a foreclosure action taken by a senior creditor."
The court based its decision on statutory construction. It found that
the use of the definite article "the" to modify the words "note" and
"trust indenture" plainly indicated that only the creditor possessing
the foreclosed obligation and trust indenture was prohibited from
obtaining a deficiency judgment.76
McKendrick, 215 Cal. App. 3d 941, 949 n.10, 263 Cal. Rptr. 781, 786 n.10 (2d Dist. Ct. App.
1989).
68. ALAsKA STAT. § 34.20.100 (1990) ('When a sale is made by a trustee under a deed of
trust... no other or further action or proceeding may be taken nor judgment entered against the
maker or the surety or guarantor of the maker, on the obligation secured by the deed of trust for
a deficiency."). Compare iaL with WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.100 (1989 & Supp. 1990) (quoted
supra note 25).
69. ALAsKA STAT. § 34.20.100 (1990).
70. 757 P.2d 1040 (Alaska 1988).
71. Id. at 1042, 1043-44.
72. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-317 (1989) ("When a trust indenture executed in conformity
with this part is foreclosed by advertisement and sale, no other or further action, suit, or
proceedings shall be taken or judgment entered for any deficiency against the grantor... on the
note, bond, or other obligation secured by the trust indenture . .
73. IM.
74. 235 Mont. 111, 765 P.2d 749 (1988).





In Washington Mutual, the court held that there is no authority in
Washington law for allowing any lienor to recover a deficiency follow-
ing a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.17 This holding places junior lienors
in an untenable position when a senior lienor elects to pursue nonjudi-
cial foreclosure, in that the junior lienors lose not only their security
but also their underlying obligations. This decision goes beyond both
the language of the anti-deficiency provisions and the policy behind
the Deed of Trust Act. As a result, the Washington Mutual decision is
likely to have a chilling effect on lenders because of the increased risk
that lenders will be unable to recover fully on their obligations. More-
over, the court's "clarification" has only made the law more uncertain.
The court should have allowed a deficiency judgment but offset the
amount of the deficiency by any surplus value in the purchased
property.
A. Washington Mutual Exceeds the Scope of the Washington Deed
of Trust Act
The court's broad holding in Washington Mutual extends the anti-
deficiency provisions beyond the scope of the Deed of Trust Act by
making the provisions applicable to all lienors regardless of their par-
ticipation in the foreclosure sale. Apparently, junior lienors lose not
only their security, but also their right to satisfaction of the underlying
obligation. This holding is inconsistent with both the language and
the purposes of the Deed of Trust Act.
1. Statutory Language Precludes Application of the Anti-Deficiency
Provisions to Non-Foreclosing Lienors
Strict statutory construction would limit the anti-deficiency provi-
sions of the Washington Deed of Trust Act to foreclosing lienors. The
ordinary rules of statutory construction, as adopted by the Washing-
ton Supreme Court, dictate applying the plain meaning of the statute's
language after giving every word effect.78 The Act's language, like
that in the Montana Code, narrowly defines its application by using
the definite article "the" to modify the words "obligation" and "deed
77. Washington Mut. Say. Bank v. United States, 115 Wash. 2d 52, 55, 793 P.2d 969, 970,
clarified, reconsideration denied, 800 P.2d 1124 (Wash. 1990).
78. Cox v. Helenius, 103 Wash. 2d 383, 387-88, 693 P.2d 683, 686 (1985); State v. Houck, 32
Wash. 2d 681, 684, 203 P.2d 693, 695 (1949); see also 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION §§ 46.01, 46.06 (4th ed. 1984).
244
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of trust."79 Thus, the deficiency judgment prohibition should only
apply to foreclosed obligations and deeds of trust. The Washington
Supreme Court should have followed its own precedent and applied
the same plain-meaning analysis as the Montana Supreme Court has,
and concluded that the Washington anti-deficiency provisions apply
only to foreclosing lienors and not to non-foreclosing junior lienors.
2. Denial of a Deficiency Judgment Is Contrary to the Purpose of
the Deed of Trust Act
The Deed of Trust Act provides an efficient alternative to the cum-
bersome judicial foreclosure that preserves the balance between lend-
ers' and borrowers' rights."0 The denial of deficiency judgment rights
to non-foreclosing junior lienors disrupts this balance by contravening
three important policy objectives. First, the lenders' and borrowers'
expectations should be met by using the property to satisfy as much of
the underlying debt as possible. Debtors should not receive unwar-
ranted windfalls. Second, foreclosing lienors should be forced to an
election of remedies and to waive their right to a deficiency in order to
obtain the more efficient nonjudicial foreclosure. At the same time,
junior lienors should not be penalized by the whim of a more senior
lienor. Third, the law should promote stability and certainty. Wash-
ington Mutual accomplishes none of these objectives.
a The Security Ought To Be Used to Satisfy as Much Debt as
Possible
Ideally, in both judicial and nonjudicial foreclosures, the full value
of the foreclosed property satisfies the entire debt and there is no defi-
ciency. Lenders take security for a debt to achieve this protection of
their loaned assets. Borrowers likewise hope to avoid further personal
liability by applying the security fully to satisfy the debt. This ideal is
accomplished when the foreclosure sale price is at least equal to the
debt. However, frequently this does not happen. The Deed of Trust
Act attempts to achieve this ideal by implementing procedures to dis-
courage deficiencies.
In a judicial foreclosure, the redemption right pressures bidders at
the foreclosure sale to bid a fair price because the borrower or a non-
foreclosing junior lienor can redeem the property at the sale price.81
79. MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-317 (1989); see supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text; cf
supra note 25.
80. See supra notes 15-25 and accompanying text.
81. WASH. REV. CODE § 6.23.010 (1989).
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Also, the court can establish an upset price in advance of the sale.82
Alternatively, if the sale price is too low, the court can refuse to con-
firm the sale unless the fair value of the property is applied to satisfy
the debt.83 These procedures support the legislative policy by forcing
the full utilization of the value of the security. Moreover, if a foreclos-
ing lienor purchases the property at the judicial foreclosure sale and
retains the property, the lienor can still obtain a judgment for the defi-
ciency." However, that deficiency should be the mnount of the debt
less the fair value of the property. In such a case the purchasing lienor
is analogous to a mortgagee who obtains the property through strict
foreclosure.85 In both cases the property itself, rather than the pro-
ceeds from the sale of the property, is used to satisfy the obligation.
Although strict foreclosure is now prohibited statutorily in most
states, including Washington, under the common law the mortgagee
could obtain a deficiency judgment equal to the difference between the
fair market value of the property and the obligation.86 This common
law principle carries through in judicial foreclosure and was recog-
nized by the legislature when it gave courts the discretion to apply the
fair value against the obligation as a condition for sale confirmation.87
If the Washington Mutual case had involved a judicial foreclosure,
Washington Mutual clearly could have obtained a deficiency judg-
ment.88 Washington Mutual's underlying obligation was for about
$30,000, and it paid $42,000 to obtain the $64,000 property.89 Thus,
Washington Mutual's total outlay was about $72,000. Assuming it
retained the property, it would have $22,000 additional value above
the purchase price. If it were to sue on the obligation, common law
principles dictate that the court not recognize the full $30,000 debt,
but instead credit the $22,000 surplus value against that debt. 90 Thus,
82. Id. § 61.12.060.
83. Mda The statute codifies the inherent equitable power of the court. Washington Mut. Say.
Bank v. Horn, 186 Wash. 75, 76-77, 56 P.2d 995 (1936) (inherent power of court to refuse to
confirm unfair sale); see also Gelfert v. Nat'l City Bank, 313 U.S. 221, 231-32 (1941) (long
history of control of judicial sales by equity courts); Federal Title & Mortgage Guaranty Co. v.
Lowenstein, 113 N.J. Eq. 200, 166 A. 538, 541 (1933) (tracing historical origins of this equitable
power).
84. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 61.12.060, .080.
85. G. OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 312, at 652; 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
469 (P. Rohan ed. 1990).
86. G. OSBORNE, supra note 20, § 312, at 652; R. POWELL, supra note 85, 469; see, eg.,
Hammond v. Stiles, 567 A.2d 444, 446 (Me. 1989).
87. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.12.060.
88. Id. § 61.12.080.
89. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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the amount of deficiency would be $8,000, the difference between the
fair market value of the property and the sum of the debt plus the
costs to acquire the property. This would be a fair result for both the
borrower and the lender.
Any result achieved through nonjudicial foreclosure ought to be
equally fair to both parties by using the security to satisfy as much of
the debt as possible. The Washington Legislature specifically provided
that in judicial foreclosures, courts may exercise discretion by credit-
ing the fair value of a property against the underlying obligation.91
The courts should exercise the same discretion to ensure fairness in a
suit for a deficiency after nonjudicial foreclosure, particularly when
the purchasing lienor does not in fact acquire nonredeemable title.
The legislature did not alter the common law equitable remedy by
prohibiting its use in the nonjudicial foreclosure alternative.92 Thus,
the security would pay each succeeding lienor as much of each debt as
possible up to, but not beyond, the full amount of the debt. Any
remaining debt above the fair market value would be the deficiency,
for which the lienor may obtain a judgment.
b. The Deed of Trust Act's Election of Remedies Should Not
Penalize Non-Foreclosing Junior Lienors
The Deed of Trust Act's bar to a deficiency judgment after a nonju-
dicial sale was not intended to deny creditors their remedies. The Act
merely requires an election of remedies and puts an additional price on
one of those elections in order to place judicial and nonjudicial foreclo-
sure on equal footing.9" The nonjudicial foreclosure alternative pro-
vides the benefit of nonredeemable title in exchange for the lienors'
loss of their right to a deficiency judgment.94 This provides strong
incentive for the lienor to ensure that the debt is not undersecured. It
provides even stronger incentive to ensure that the price bid at a fore-
closure sale is fair and at least covers the obligation.95
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.12.060.
92. The California "fair value" provisions also apply surplus value against a purchasing
junior lienor's obligation to compute any deficiency, whether the junior ilenor purchases at a
judicial or a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text. The
anti-deficiency and "fair value" provisions are complementary, providing an equitable result
regardless of the foreclosure method, and regardless of whether a junior ienor purchases at the
foreclosure sale. See generally Hetland, Deficiency Judgment Limitations in California-A New
Judicial Approach, 51 CALiF. L. REv. 1, 28-31 (1963).
93. See supra notes 16-33 and accompanying text.
94. Id.
95. In fact, there is strong incentive for the foreclosing senior lienor to bid up to the full
amount of its debt at the sale. At best, this sets a minimum sale price. At worst, the lender
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The same incentive does not exist for non-foreclosing junior lienors
because the junior lienors are not in control.96 Once the senior lienor
forecloses and sells the property, junior lienors lose their security no
matter what price is paid. The surplus over the senior lienor's obliga-
tion received from the sale will be paid over to satisfy other creditors'
obligations.9 7 However, if junior lienors also are ba.red from suing on
the obligation, then the junior lienors recover less than their full debt
when the security is sold for less than the combined amount due on
both the senior and junior obligations. This is true regardless of what
other assets the debtor may have.
Although junior lienors have no redemption right, they can
purchase at the trustee's sale. However, if the net value of the prop-
erty, or the fair market value less the sale price, is less than the junior
lienors' obligations and the junior lienors are barred from a deficiency
judgment, then they will not improve their positions by purchasing the
security. Junior lienors will be discouraged from any competitive bid-
ding that reduces the net value. Faced with foreclosing property with
market value less than the likely sale price plus the debt, junior lienors
would choose judicial foreclosure and a right to a deficiency judgment.
When the senior lienor preempts that choice, junior lienors should not
be penalized.98
c. Courts Should Promote Stability and Certainty in the Law
Stability and certainty in the law are important to lenders because
real property financing generally involves long-term obligations.99
The legislature, through the Deed of Trust Act, ory altered common
law mortgage concepts in well-defined areas." Therefore, the court
ought to construe narrowly any legislative change to that common law
norm.101 It is true that a clear and unequivocal interpretation of the
law that is contrary to current expectations would have provided a
new set of expectations for future transactions. However, the Wash-
ington Mutual decision is neither clear nor unequivocal because of the
acquires the secured property for the price of the debt, returning rhe lender to its original
position.
96. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
97. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.080.
98. Accord Helbling Bros. v. Turner, 14 Wash. App. 494, 497-98, 542 P.2d 1257, 1259
(1975).
99. G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, supra note 18, § 1.1, at 2.
100. See WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.020 ("Except as provided in this chapter, a deed of trust
is subject to all laws relating to mortgages on real property.").
101. C. SANDs, supra note 78, §§ 50.01, 50.05; see also WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.020;
Kennebec, Inc. v. Bank of the West, 88 Wash. 2d 718, 724-25, 565 P.2d 812, 815-16 (1977).
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court's confusing "clarification." Even if Washington Mutual were
clear, because court decisions are retroactive interpretations of existing
law, the ruling still would thwart the expectations of current lenders
who entered into their transactions with the reasonable expectation of
a right to full recovery.
3. Washington Case Law Does Not Support Extension of the Anti-
Deficiency Provisions to Non-Foreclosing Junior Lienors
The Washington Mutual decision deviates from past Washington
Supreme Court decisions that viewed the anti-deficiency provisions as
a price imposed on foreclosing lienors' choice to use the more efficient
and inexpensive nonjudicial method.1 "2 In Fluke, the court reasoned
that it is the election of nonjudicial foreclosure that limits the rem-
edy. 103 Lienors gain certain advantages by choosing nonjudicial fore-
closure, but they also give up their right to obtain a deficiency
judgment. In Washington Mutual, on the other hand, the court denied
a deficiency to the non-foreclosing junior lienor irrespective of its lack
of election to foreclose nonjudicially. Thus, Washington Mutual does
not adhere to the quid-pro-quo rationale of Fluke. Similarly, the
Washington Mutual decision is not in accord with Donovick, in that
the Washington Mutual court extinguished both the junior lienor's
security and its underlying obligation." 4 It did so, not as the junior
lienor's price for choosing the nonjudicial procedure, but merely
because a senior lienor exercised its choice.
B. The Chilling Effect of Washington Mutual on Lenders
The Washington Supreme Court's holding in Washington Mutual
and its subsequent "clarification" may have a chilling effect on lenders,
especially those potentially in a junior position. Lenders could be
reluctant to make loans and take junior lienor positions because the
"clarification" makes Washington law uncertain. More importantly,
these lenders may be unwilling to risk the loss of their right to recover
on the obligation as a result of the court's broad application of the
anti-deficiency provisions in the initial Washington Mutual decision.
102. See supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
103. Fluke Capital & Management Servs. Co. v. Richmond, 106 Wash. 2d 614, 724 P.2d 356
(1986).
104. Donovick v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 111 Wash. 2d 413, 757 P.2d 1378 (1988); see supra
notes 30-33 and accompanying text for discussion of Donovick
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L The "Clarification" Has Made Washington Law Uncertain
The Washington Supreme Court's "clarification" of the Washing-
ton Mutual holding has increased the confusion rather than clarified
the law because the term "sue the debtor on the promissory note" is
the same as "sue for a deficiency." 105 When the court "clarified" its
decision in Washington Mutual, it apparently intended to address
some ambiguity in the opinion."° The court seemed to distinguish
deficiency judgments from suits on the obligation. "Deficiency judg-
ment" is generally associated with judicial foreclosures because there
is an actual judgment as part of the foreclosure. The court may have
intended a semantic distinction between the two processes because
there is no judgment in a nonjudicial foreclosure. Thus, "deficiency
judgment" would apply only to judicial foreclosures and a "suit on the
obligation" would apply to nonjudicial foreclosures. This distinction
is confusing because the anti-deficiency provisions of the Deed of
Trust Act, which only apply to nonjudicial foreclosure, use the terms
"deficiency decree or other judgment."' 7
The court need not have distinguished between a "deficiency judg-
ment" and a "suit on the obligation" regarding the federal redemption
statute because the statute does not use the term "deficiency judg-
ment." Instead it refers to "the amount of the obligation secured by
such lien to the extent satisfied by reason of such sale."' 08 The court
may have intended to leave open the possibility of distinguishing later
cases by limiting the Washington Mutual holding to the facts of that
case: a federal tax lien redemption from a non-foreclosing junior lienor
who purchases at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. However, if this was
the court's intent it should have clearly stated so. Further, it would
have been unnecessary to distinguish future cases if the court had sim-
ply applied the property's surplus value against the obligation before
determining any deficiency.
2. Washington Mutual Has ;ncreased Lenders' Risk
The broad holding in Washington Mutual transforms the anti-defi-
ciency provisions and the entire Deed of Trust Act from an equitable,
efficient alternative to judicial foreclosure into a system that not only
will penalize junior lienors but also could have a wide-reaching effect
on both lenders and borrowers throughout the state. The potential
105. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 421-22 (6th ed. 1990).
106. See supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
107. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.100 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
108. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2410(d) (West 1978).
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inequity of denying a deficiency judgment to non-foreclosing junior
lienors is best shown by returning to the Mega Corporation
hypothetical.
Mega's office building, with a fair market value of $1,000,000, now
is encumbered by a first deed of trust securing a $900,000 debt and a
second deed of trust securing a $50,000 debt, together representing
ninety-five percent of the market value of the building, or $950,000. A
contractor performs minor remodeling work on an executive's office
and files a mechanic's lien for the amount due, $3,000. Mega defaults
on the first deed of trust and International Bank nonjudicially fore-
closes. Lacking the cash to purchase the building, or considering the
$950,000 cash outlay to protect a $3,000 debt unreasonable, the con-
tractor does not bid ai the foreclosure sale. If the anti-deficiency pro-
visions were applied to any non-foreclosing junior lienor, the debt
underlying the mechanic's lien would be extinguished. The contractor
would have no recourse, even though the $50,000 surplus from the
sale at fair market value would be available to satisfy general
creditors.1° 9
The result in this hypothetical is even more extraordinary when one
considers that the contractor actually could improve its position by
releasing the security. 110 If the contractor were to release the
mechanic's lien prior to the nonjudicial foreclosure, then the contrac-
tor would become an ordinary creditor and not a non-foreclosing jun-
ior lienor. Neither the Washington Mutual decision nor the anti-
deficiency provisions would apply. This creates an incentive to release
security that would not otherwise exist. The contractor could then sue
on its debt and recover, along with other general creditors, out of the
$50,000 surplus from the sale. In other words, such a creditor would
be better off by not taking security for the obligation!
Perhaps the most egregious case is the judgment creditor. Suppose
our contractor had not filed a mechanic's lien. Then, when Mega
failed to pay for the remodeling, the contractor obtained a judgment
for the $3,000. A person who obtains a judgment automatically
obtains a lien on the judgment debtor's real property, junior to the
other liens.11 If International Bank, a senior lienor, were to elect to
109. The foreclosing lienor would have to pay over to the superior court any amount realized
from the sale of the security in excess of the debt and expenses. The court would then apply
these funds against other lien claims. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.080 (1989).
110. A lienor may elect to abandon the security and sue upon the debt alone. Sullins v.
Sullins, 65 Wash. 2d 283, 285, 396 P.2d 886, 888 (1964); see also 51 AM. JUR. 2D Liens § 41, at
180 (1970).
111. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.56.190.
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foreclose nonjudicially, the contractor would lose both the lien and the
judgment even though the contractor did not choose to attach the lien.
Under these circumstances, lenders may be reluctant to make loans
secured by junior liens. Lenders have few options. They may charge
higher interest rates to offset the increased risks, Cr establish greater
equity requirements. This could have a severe impact on large com-
mercial property financing. Equally important, it could well devastate
ordinary homeowners by making unavailable or unaffordable the now-
common home equity loans that are used for such things as home
improvements and children's college educations.
C. The Supreme Court Should Have Recognized the Junior Lienor's
Right to a Deficiency Judgment, Subject to Offset by Any
Surplus
The Washington Mutual court should have held that any non-fore-
closing junior lienor has a right to a deficiency judgment following a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale, provided that when the junior lienor
purchases at the foreclosure sale, the difference between the price paid
and the fair market value of the property acquired must first be
applied against the obligation to determine the amnount of a defi-
ciency. 112 This approach overcomes the complication created by the
IRS's redemption, and accounts for the equitable considerations
unique to this case. Thus, the court would have accomplished the
same result for Washington Mutual without altering the law.
L The Federal Tax Lien Complication
The court's decision in the Washington Mutual case was made diffi-
cult by the particular facts of the case. Strong equitable considerations
pointed toward a decision in favor of Washington Mutual. In the nor-
mal scheme of nonjudicial foreclosure, Washington Mutual would
have acquired nonredeemable title to the property it purchased at the
trustee's sale."' However, the third-position federal tax lien compli-
cated the issues by giving the IRS a federal statutory right of redemp-
tion unavailable to other Washington lienors in nonjudicial
foreclosure."I4 This redemption right could cost Washington Mutual
any advantage it may have gained by purchasing the property. At the
foreclosure sale, Washington Mutual had paid only the amount
112. See supra notes 81-92 and accompanying text.
113. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.050 (1989).
114. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
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remaining on Yakima's loan.' 5 Under the federal tax lien redemption
rules, if Washington Mutual were not allowed any deficiency judg-
ment, the IRS would have to pay Washington Mutual its purchase
price plus the amount of the deficiency deemed satisfied by the sale,
but not more than fair market value.' 1 6 In this case, Washington
Mutual would realize $21,080, or about two-thirds of its obligation.
The IRS would gain nothing, because it would have to pay fair market
value for the property.
On the other hand, if Washington Mutual could retain its right to a
deficiency judgment for the full amount of its obligation, the IRS
would be obliged to pay only the foreclosure sale price. 1 7 The IRS
would acquire the foreclosed property for about two-thirds its market
value and could recover at least some of the taxes owed. Washington
Mutual could sue the debtors personally on the underlying note.
However, because the debtors were bankrupt, Washington Mutual
would recover nothing. Yakima, which elected the foreclosure
method, would be paid in full. The IRS, third in priority, would
recover some of its taxes. Thus, Washington Mutual would literally
be "caught in the middle." Washington Mutual should not be penal-
ized in favor of a more junior lienor, the IRS, because Washington
Mutual did not choose the foreclosure process and merely purchased
the property to protect its interests."
8
2. The Equitable Considerations Could Have Been Accounted For
by Applying the Surplus to the Deficiency
The Washington Supreme Court failed to address a third option
that could have accomplished the same equitable result for Washing-
ton Mutual without denying a deficiency judgment. In so doing, the
court failed to consider adequately both the creditor's right to be paid
fully and the disposition of the surplus value in the foreclosed prop-
erty. The court should have allowed a judgment only for the defi-
ciency remaining after applying the surplus value in the acquired
property against Washington Mutual's underlying obligation. In
other words, because Washington Mutual acquired a $64,000 property
115. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
116. Id.
117. Id This price is limited by the federal redemption statute. In normal redemption after a
judicial foreclosure, a redemptioner such as the IRS would have to pay the foreclosure sale price
plus the amount of any more senior liens, such as Washington Mutual's. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 6.23.020.
118. Of course, Washington Mutual could have protected itself before foreclosure by paying
off and reinstating Yakima's obligation. See supra note 24.
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for only $42,000, the $22,000 surplus value in the property should be
applied against the $30,000 remaining on Washington Mutual's obli-
gation, yielding an $8,000 deficiency for which Washington Mutual
could seek a judgment. Since the debtors are bankrupt, Washington
Mutual likely would be unable to recover that deficiency, but would
have received about two-thirds of the debt in property value. The full
value of the security is thus used to satisfy, in priority, as much debt as
possible-all of Yakima's and two-thirds of Washington Mutual's
obligations.
The federal redemption statute requires the IRS to pay Washington
Mutual's purchase price plus the amount of the secured obligation sat-
isfied by the sale. Because Washington Mutual acquired the surplus
value in the property through the foreclosure sale, and used it to sat-
isfy part of the obligation, the $22,000 would be included in the
redemption price. The IRS would have to pay Washington Mutual
the same amount in either case: the fair market value, $64,000. The
IRS would be unlikely to seek redemption if required to pay fair mar-
ket value because it would gain nothing. However, regardless of
whether the IRS purchases, Yakima would be paid. in full and Wash-
ington Mutual would obtain two-thirds of its obligation.119 The junior
lienors' obligations would remain and could be satisfied by other
assets, yet no lienor would receive a windfall.
D. Recommended Solution
Either the courts or the legislature could resolve the present uncer-
tainty in the law. Perhaps the Washington Supreme Court will, in
some future case, further clarify its holding in Washington Mutual by
limiting the case to its unusual facts-a non-foreclosing junior lienor
that purchases at the trustee's sale and is subject to a tax lien redemp-
tion. However, this artificial approach would not completely resolve
the conflict, because the basis for even such a limited holding would be
unclear. The non-foreclosing junior lienor's right to enforce its obliga-
tion should not depend upon either a senior lienor's choice of remedy
or on the identity of a more junior lienor. The court could also
unequivocally overrule Washington Mutual. However, this would
require both a willing court and a suitable case, either of which may be
lacking. A legislative solution is a better alternative.
The Washington Legislature should amend the anti-deficiency pro-
visions specifically to exempt the non-foreclosing :iunior lienor. Sec-
119. The Shells' insolvency and the federal statute cause Washington Mutual to receive only
two-thirds. If the Shells were solvent, Washington Mutual would receive full payment.
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tion 61.24.100 of the Revised Code of Washington should be changed
to read: "Foreclosure ... shall satisfy the obligation secured by the
deed of trust foreclosed, but not a lien or mortgage or trust deed junior
to the one foreclosed ....o Such an amendment would comport
with the purpose of the Deed of Trust Act while preserving the fore-
closing lienor's choice of remedies. It would also retain the burdens
placed upon the foreclosing lienor that chooses nonjudicial foreclo-
sure. At the same time, it would not penalize the non-foreclosing jun-
ior lienor when a senior lienor elects remedies over which the junior
lienor has no control.
III. CONCLUSION
As a result of the Washington Mutual decision, the reach of the
Washington anti-deficiency provisions in nonjudicial foreclosures is
unclear. These provisions always have been applied to a lienor who
forecloses. Now they may also apply to all non-foreclosing junior lien-
ors. If so, the Washington Mutual holding is contrary to the case law
of other states with similar provisions and is inconsistent with both the
language and the purpose of the Washington Deed of Trust Act.
More important, application to non-foreclosing junior lienors is unfair.
Such application destroys the creditor's reasonable expectation of full
payment of a just debt and results in the unjust enrichment of the
debtor. A more harmonious, rational and symmetrical result would
be achieved by allowing non-foreclosing junior lienors to sue for a defi-
ciency, subject to offset by any surplus value acquired by purchasing at
the trustee's sale. Therefore, the Washington Legislature immediately
should amend the Deed of Trust Act to rectify this unfortunate
decision.
John D. Sullivan
120. For comparison with current statutory language, see supra note 25.
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